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Research into ·the background of the Second Amendment
is hampered by its ·relationship to the current _highly emotional debate over gun control·.

Many otherwise useful

secondary sources either ignore the issue completely or
give

ac~ounts

which reflect the controversies of the twen-

tieth century rather than those of the eighteenth.

Fortu-

nately, however, the Americans of the revolutionary era
.....

wrote extensively about the subject.
\

With independence, the Americans were faced with the
problem of organizing and controlling a defence establish-

l
ment.

The new nation was virtually defenceless:

the

Continental Army was disbanded and the militia, after years
of neglect, emasculated.

During the decade following the

War for Independence, many unsuccessful attempts were made
to revitalize the militia and thus prevent the establishment of a professional army.

With the adoption of the

Constitution in 1787, military affairs reached a turning
point.

The central government was granted almost unlimited

power to riise a standing army without any firm mandate to
reform the militia.

In an attempt to prevent this and
)

assure that the people would continue to coritrol the military power of the. nation, the Second Amendment was adopted
as a part of the Eill of Rights.
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A WELL REGULATED MILITIA
The Second Amendment is unlike the other articles in
the Bill of Rights because its two parallel rights were
intended to protect the other primary rights of life,
liberty and property.1

Indeed, the constitutional guaran-

tee of the right to bear arms was considered to be written
recognition of the natural right of self defence,2 while a
"'
'

popular militia was believed to be inseparable from sovereignty.3

Though today virtually ignored, the Second Amend-

ment formed a vital part of American constitutional theory
through most_of the nineteenth century.

For example,

.Joseph Story, the conservative protegee of Chief Justice
John Marshall wrote:

I

The importance of this article will scarely be
doubted by any persons, who have duly reflected
upon the subject. The militia is the natural de-·
fence of a free country against sudden foreign
invasions, domestic insurrections, and domestic
usurpations of power by rulers. It is against
1Robert A. Sprecher, "The Lost Amendment," The Journal
of the American Bar Association, Vol.·51 (June & July, ~965)

554-557, 665-669---r.557, 668).

.

. 2Robert Green McCloskey, ed, The Works of James
Wilson, 2 vols. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1967),
p. 657.

3John.Adams, A Defence of the Constitution· and Govern-·
ment of the United S-tates of Americ"a.,- J_ vol·s ,_.:..(New York:.
Da Capo Press, 1971), p. 475; John Taylor, An Inquiry into
the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United
States, ed by Loren Buritz--rindianapolis:· The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc, originally published 1814), p. 430.

2

sound policy for a free people to keep up large
military establishments and standing armies in
time of peace, both from the enormous expenses,
with which they are attended, and the facile
means, which they afford to ambitious and un•
principled rulers,
subvert the government,
or trample upon the rights of the people. The
right of the citizens to keep and bear arms
h~s justly been considered, as the palladium of
the liberties of a republic; since it offers a
strong moral check ftgainst the usurpation and
arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally,
even if these are successful in the first
instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them ••• this truth would seem so clear,
and the importance of a well regulated militia
would see~ so undeniable, it cannot be disguised •••

to

In addition to these obvious benefits, however,
militia service seemed to be a perfect method by which
the only true basis of republican government, civic virtue,
could be spread throughout society.

In the words of John

Warren (whose physician brother Joseph had been killed
while serving as a Nolunteer at the Battle of Breed's
Hil~

in 1775):

A general prevalance of that love for our
country which teaches us to esteem it glorious
to die in her defence, is the only means of
perpetuating the enjoyment of that liberty and
security, for the support of which all government was originally intended ••• The man who willingly would die to save his Country, would
4Joseph Story, Commentaries .QI!. the Constitution of
the United States, 3 vols., Introduction by Arthur E.
Sutherland, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), III, pp.
246-247. Similar comments were expressed throughout the
nineteenth· century. For a late example, See: Thomas M.
Cooley, LLD, A Treatise .Qr! the Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest Upon The Legislative Power of the States of the
American Union, Sixth Edition, with Additional Material by
Alexis C. Angle, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1890), p. 427.
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J
surely sacrifice his fortune and possessions,
to secure her peace and.happiness ••• 5
The reason the American revolutionaries placed so
much faith in a universal militia system is to be found in
their concept of power.

Power, and the desire to acquire

it, were considered to be natural, normal, and. necessary
parts of any political system.

However, power, like alco-

hol, tended to intoxicate and corrupt those who used it.
Thus the same power which was intended to protect society
could as easily be subverted into an instrument of destruction. 6

The problem was, as John Adams noted in a letter to

Thomas Jefferson, that:
Power always thinks it has a great soul and vast
views beyond the comprehension of the weak; and
that it is doing God's service when it is violating all His laws. Our passions, ambitions, avarice,
love and resentments, etc., possess so much metaphysical subtlety and so much overpowering eloquence
that they insinuate themselves into the understanding and the concience and convert both to their
party.7
If one accepts, as the- ·American revolutionaries did,
the proposition that the ultimate and most dangerous
expression of power in society is ·military force, then the
5John Warren, "An Oration, Delivered July 4th, 178J,
in Gordon S. Wood, ed, The Rising Glory of America: 17601820, (New York: George Bazillie·r, 1971). pp. 55-69
T3b-57).
6Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1965),
pp. 55-60.
-7Quoted in Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American
History, (New .York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), p. 21.
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control of that force becomes an issue of major concern.8
It was believed that if this power was placed in the hands
of a mercenary standing army controlled by the government,
then the rulers would be in a position to enforce their
will upon the people.

However, if the military power was

distributed throughout society in the manner desired by the
supporters of the Second Amendment, then the people would
be able to resist the inherent tyrannical tendencies of
government.9

Indeed, under the Federal Constitution, the-

mili tia is the only institution charged with the function
of law enforcement and defence.10·.The idea was, according
to Joel Barlow, an American aristocrat, revolutionary, and
supporter of the Constitution of 1787, that the policy of
the United States should consist of:
.•• making eV:~ry citizen a soldier, and every
soldier a ci~izen; not only permitting every man
to arm, but obliging him to arm. This fact, told
8 walter Millis, Arms and Men:· __ A Study in American
Military History, {New York: G.P •. Putnam'.s Sons, 1956) ,:
p. 15.

I·
~

!

9Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radi~als and the De'Velopment of American OppositiO'i1'"to Britain, 1765-1776:-TNew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972),
p. 46; Danial ~. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial __
Experience,. (New York: Random.House; Inc, 1958),-pp. 351-352: Louis Smith, American Democracy and Militar) Power,
{Chicago: The University ·or Chicago Press, 1951 , p. 306.

~

10Article One, Section Eight, Clause Fifteen. An
early attempt to.institutionalize this provision occurred
in 1792 when Congress passed. "An Act to provide £or calling
forth the Militia to execute:the ·1aws·of the Union, sup- ·
press insurrections, and Tepel invasions." See: United
States Statutes at Large,-Vol I, Ch 28.
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in Europe previous to the French Revolution, would
have gained little credit; or at least it would
have been regarded as a mark of an uncivilized
people, extremly dangerous to a well-ordered socei ty. Men who build systems on an inversion of

nature are obliged to invert everything that is to
make part of that system. It is because the people are civilized that they are with safety armed. It is an effect of their conscious dignity,
as citizens enjoying equal rights that they wish
not to invade the rights of others. The danger
(where there is any) from armed citizens, is only
to the government, not to the society; and as
long as they have nothing to revenge in the government (which they cannot have while it is in
their own hands) there are many advantages in
their being accustomed to the use of arms, and no
possible disadvantages.
Power, habitually in the hands of a whole
community, loses all the ordinary associated ideas
of power ••• Where the government is not in the
hands of the people, there you find oppression ••• 11
Actually this faith in a popular militia was grounded

in more than i·deology.

It was an extremly logical and

reasonable position based upon the American revolutionaries
experience and supportable by almost endless examples drawn
from history and their contemporary world.

It seemed that

those nations (such as the Swiss or the Americans themselves) which had managed to retain or win their freedom
always had done so with a vigilant and well armed population.

Once these virtues were abandoned in favor of reli-

ance upon mercenaries, liberty began to decline and was
eventually lost, often to the same standing army which had
11Joel Barlow, "Equality in Americans," in William
Benton, ed, The Annals of America, 18 vols., (Chicago:
Encyclopaed~a Britannica-Inc, 1968), Vol. III, pp.· 504512 {504-505).
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been used for its defense.12
The colonial militia, which the revolutionary generation sought to preserve, had developed out of the frontier

necessity to survives

b~th

individually and collectively.

While it would be wrong to idealize it, it would be equally
wrong to dismiss it as useless.13

Simply stated, early

colonial military-policy consisted of keeping as much of
the population as well armed as possible.14

Every man,

woman and child was considered to be a soldier because they
all lived on a potential battlefield.15

Maryland, for

example, required "every housekeeper, or housekeepers," to
maintain specified arms, equipment and ammunition "within
his, her or their house,

I

1•

fo~

him or themselves and for

every person within his, her or their house able to bear
arms."

Further, in case of emergency, households with

three men and households with five men were to send one and
two respectively to.a prearranged. rallying point.16
12 Bailyn, .Q.E. cit, pp. 63-66. For the effect upon
Anglo-American political theory of the seizure of power, in
the previous century, by Oliver Cromwell and the New Model
Army, See: John McAuley Palmer, General ·Von Steuben, (Port
Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, Inc, 1966), pp. 218219.
~
13walter Millis, The Constitution and The Common
Defence, (New York: The Fund For the Republic, 1959),
pp. 11-12; John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the
British Army in the Coming of the American-RevoiutTon--(Princeton: The Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 18.
14Boorstin, .Q.E cit, .p. 353.
15rbid, pp. 349-351.
1 6The Selective Service System, Military Obligations

7
However, that the goal was seldom realized is demonstrated by the fact that before 1755, the colonial governments in the area which became the United States, collectively passed more 'than 5,000 separate statutes related to
compulsory militia service.17

The initial problem to be

overcome was that an effective militia system was dependent
upon a high population density.
enough men, so

t~at

Only when there were

some could sta, behind as home guards,

could the--mili tiamen be relied upon to lea.Ye their- homes_ - when called.
:

In fact, until fairly late in the colonial

period, only New England, with its township pattern of
settlement, could effectively defend itself strictly with
militia. 18
·Throughout the

seventee~th

century, most of New Eng-

land had laws similar to the Massachusetts Act of May i4,

1645:
All inhabitants are required to keep arms and
ammunition in their homes whether or not they areenrolled in the militia and are required to muste~
The American Traditions, ~Compilation of the Enactments of
Compulsion From the Earliest- Settlements- of the Original
Thirteen Colonies in 1607 Through the Articles of Confederation in 1.Z§.2., Special Monograph-No._ 1 Vol~ II in i4 parts
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), part ,5,
p. 6.
17rbid, part 1, pp. 11-12. _
18non Higginbothan, The War of American _Independence:
Mili.tary Attitudes,_ Policies and _Practices,~ 1763-lZ§.2:,_ (New
York: The- Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 8-; :John- W. Shy,
"A New Look -at the Colon1al' -Militia·," The William and Mary
Quarterly, third series, XX, No. 2 (April, 1963), pp. 175185 (178-179).
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muster twice a year.19
New Hampshire and Connecticut required "all persons" over
sixteen to be armed and "male persons" were to have a
musket and be enrolled in the militia.20

Children between

ten and sixteen were to be instructe.d in the use of arms ;21
while "single persons" were prohibited from establishing
-

independent households unless they

~ou~~

Bfford to stock

them with the legally required arms and ammunition and men
too poor to equip themselves for militia service could be
bound out for the cost of the arms.22

Even as late as 1702

Connecticut required thats
~11 persons shall serve in the w~tch, those who
are absent on lawful occasions, sick or incapacitated or widdows may furnish substitutes in place
of personal service.23

Then gradually, as the population increased and the frontier
receded, references to women
and children
disappeared from
.
.
.

the militia laws.

Also, the upper age limit"_ was lowered

in some areas although the older-men-were still required to
pass muster and were
officers. 2 4

per~itte~

.to vote for the company

19The ·Selective Service System, . .QE .cit,_ part 6, ·p-. 29.
20 rbid, part 7, p. 12.

--

21Ibid, part 6, p. 26.
22rbid, part 6, p. 11.
23Ibid, ·part 2, pp.--14..:15 .24rbid, part 2, p. 119.
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New England's militia officers were normally electeds
ensigns, lieutenants and captains by the militiamen of
their company and majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels
by

the company

officers~

Militia affairs were administered

locally by a militia committee made up of the senior
militia officers and the elected township officials.

How-

ever, the most important individual was the "Clerk of the
Band" or company clerk whose task it was to keep track of
the status of every person subject to the militia laws
within the companies district.25

Because so much responsi-

bility was placed in local hands, the.quality of the militia
tended to yary widely from colony to colony and even between
the militia districts within a single colony, often in

di~·

rect relationship.to the proximity of danger.26
As the colonies entered the eighteenth century, the
colonia~

governments began to abandon their attempts to

create 'a "nation-in-arms."

Even in the more popular colo-

nial wars, the militia had been reluctant to march out of_
its home districts, but as more and more territory became

I
''

I

I
I

secure from direct attack from Frenchmen-or Indians the
pro-blem became progressively more diffi.cul t.

As _defence

25Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military
Policy," Military Affairs (Summer, 1958), pp. 75-82 (76);
James H. Huston, The Sinues of War: Army Logistics 1.ZZ.S.1.2...21, _(Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), p. 5.
26Morton, .£E cit, p. 80.

·
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b~gan

to be viewed as an imperial rather than a local prob-

lem by both the colonists and the colonial governments, the
militia became primarily a law enforcement agency.

However,

with the law enforcement p9wer in the hands of the people
at large, the governments found themselves literally helpless in the face of widespread opposition.

Any law which

proved to be unpopular with the broad llliddle.

cla~s,

from

which the militia was drawn, was simply ignored unless the
colonial authorities could find enough £ritish regulars to
enforce it.

Even then the authorities were often faced

with widespread rioting in which the militiamen· participatea.27

Beginning about 1709 the colonial governors began

increasingly to petition London for regular troops to enforce the law upon unwilling colonists.

Finally in 1754,

the- imperial authorities decided to abandon the militia
syste~

in favor of regular troops supported by selective-

ly recruited "Independent Companies of Volunteers •-"~ 8
These- ·changes were·, -of course,- ·'opposed: by the cola- ··
nial legislatures who had always resisterl.moves by the
Royal governors to -gain control of the military power of
2 7Maier, QE cit, p. 17; Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston
Massacre, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.- Inc, 1970), pp. 6061; Shy, Toward Lexington, .212 cit, pp. 36-44.

.

-

!

28Howard H. Peckham, The Colonial Wars l~f5-1z62,
·The University of Chicago Press, 19
,- pp.
137-138 •
(Chicago~

l
l
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the society.29

One such attempt occurred in Delaware in

1754, where the. legislature included a lengthy statement
of political philosophy in its militia reform act:
WHEREAS Self-preservation is the first Principle
and Law of Nature, and a Duty that every Man
indispensibly owes not only to himself but to the
Supreme Director and Governor of the Universe,
who gave him a Being. AND WHEREAS, in a State
of political Society and Government, a~l Men by
their original Compact and Agreement are obliged
to unite in defending themselves, and those of the
same Community, against such as shall attempt unlawfully to deprive them of their just Rights and
Liberties ••• a well regulated Militia is the most
effectual Guard and Security to every Country •••
that the Inhabitants may be armed, trained and
be enabled not only to assert the just Rights of
his Majesty's Crown, but also to defend themselves, their Lives and Properties, and,preserve
the many invaluable Privileges they enjoy under
their present happy Constitution.Jo
This and other attempts at militia reform were largely
ineffective in the face of imperial hostility.- The militia,
except in areas such as New England, continued to deteriorate.

Active militia service became more and more a mark· of

respectability or full citizenship in the community
and less universal obligation.31

~nd.less

Even during the French and

Indian War the British government ignored the militia.

In-

stead they recruited their colonial contingents from classes
29Rooert Walsh, Jr, An Appeal from .the Judgments of
Great Britain Respecting the United States of America,
Second Edi~ion (1819), Reprinted: (New York: Negro University Press, 1966), p. 11.
JOselective. Service System, .QE. cit,_ p. 13, 16. ·
31shy, "New Look," .Q.£ cit, p. 182.

1
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which lay outside the militia systems

poor. and rootless

whites, indentured servants,. "tame" and friendly Indians,
and free Negroes and mullatoes, the very classes which
along with slaves the militia in normal times was expected
to keep under contro1.32

As a result, the overall quality

of the American troops was extremly low and the British
generally acquired a contempt for the fighting abilities
of the colonists which would last until well into the War
for Independence.33

32shy, Toward Lexington,

.Q.:Q

cit, p. 16, 40.

33shy, "New Look," .Q..E. cit, p. 185.

THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The causes of the American Revolution were many and
varied.

Constitutionally it stemmed from Parliament's

need to justify the change in tbe Constitution brought
about by the execution of Charles the First and the abolition of the Monarchy and the House of Lords.

As part

of this justification, the House of Commons, in 1649,
enacted a statute which declared all_English lands outside
the Realm were to be the property of the people of England
with the colonists having no other rights than Parliament,
for its own convenience, chose to give them.34
the

Mon~rchy

Later, after

and the House of Lords were restored in 1660,

this innovation was retained, never to be abandoned.

(Even

today, for example, Parliament in theory claims the right
to legislate for Canada and.other portions of the Commonwealth which recognize the Queen as -the head of state.}
However, .unlike nearby Ireland where this theory was enforced almost immediately,

~he

doctrine 6f Parliamentary

sovereignty had little impact upon England's North American
possessions.

The colonies were simply too smail, too

distant, and too unprofitable for the English government

J4cha~les Howard Mc!lwain, The American Revolutions·
A Constitutional Interpretation, (New Yorks The Macmillan
Company, 1923), pp. 21-26.
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to bother about.35
It was not until a hundred and twenty-five years
later, that Britain had both the time and the inclination to
attempt to bring the colonies to heal.

As a result of her

victory in the Seven Years' War, Britain had gained possession of an extensive, world-wide empire and with it a need
.for imperial reform.

In their attempt to create an inte-

grated colonial system that could be governed, policed and
defended from London, the King and his ministers decided to
increase the peacetime size of the standing army.36

This

decision was complicated by the realities of home politics
which prevented the government from either stationing the
new regiments in the British Isles or from supporting them
from British tax revenues.

As a solution to both of these

problems, it was decided to quarter most of the expanded
army in North America and to tax the colonies for its
support.37. However, with the French threat finally gone
from Canada, many Americans (who cared little for imperial
problems) saw this new policy· as a calculated attempt to
35compare the Irish Declaratory Act of 1719 with the ·
American Declaratory Act of 1766. See: Ibid, 'pp. 49~61.

,.

36shy, Toward- Lexington_, .Q.l?. cit, pp. 45-46; J.F.C.
Fuller, A Military History of the Western World, 3 vols.,
(New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1954-1956), Vol. II,
p. 257.

37Shy, Toward.Lexington, .QB cit, pp. 46-51; Bernard
Knollenberg,- Origin.of the·~~mericah Revolution:, J1..5.2.-17~6',
Revised Edition, (New York: The Free Press, 19611~. 9 •

15
subvert what they considered to be their rightful constitutional relationship with the mother country.

1

Most of the American colonies had been founded while
England was ruled by the King with the aid of & council and
when the prevailing constitutional theory was government by
compact.38

Once transposed to the New World, theory became

fact when social compacts were used as the basis for the
governments of Plymouth,

Connec~cut

and Rhode Island colo-

nies, and for Maine between the death of Sir Fernando Gorges
and its annexation to Massachusetts-Bay.

Also, within

colonies social compacts became the standard method of
organizing new communities.

Before leaving for the fron-

tier, groups of settlers customarily organized 'themselves
into three distinct bodies:

"a civil body politick," a

military company and a religious congregation.39
There

wer~

three principle reasons for the growth of

compact government in British North America:

first, the i-

solated pattern of settlements encouraged self-reliance and
in practice made the towns as independent of the colonial
· 38Peck~am, .Q.E cit, p. 218; George H. Sabine, A History
of Political Theory, Third Edition, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 489-490.
39Morrison Sharp, "Leadership and Democracy in the
Early New England System of Defence," American Historical
Review, Vol. L, No. 2, (January, 1945), 244-260 (245).
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government as the latter was of London;40 second, most of
the established and essentially feudal forces of European
civilization (the great landed estates, the hereditary social classes and a powerful autonomous church) failed to
make the transition across the Atlantic in a viable form;41
and third, the fact that most of the colonists were drawn
from the seventeenth century "middle class" (farmers, artisans and tradesmen) which, as a group, were most susceptible to the ideas of the radicals and non-conformists.42
Once planted in the New World, both the theory and
practice of self-government by social compact began to grow
rapidly.

Its development was aided by hundreds of electoral

"reforms" many of which wefe instituted for partisan advantage, but which '['ere democratic in effect.43

Thus, by 1763,

when th~ British government finally got around to enforcing
.

.

its concept. of s,'overeignty, it ran up. against a century and·

40Thomas J. Wertenbaker, The First Americans: 1~071690, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), pp. 3- ;
Herbert Collis Parsons, A Puritan Outpost: A History of
the Town and People of Northfield Massachusetts, (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1937), p. 178.
41stephen Foster, Their Solitary Way: ~Puritan
Social Ethic in the First Century of Settlement, {New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 155-156; Dan Lacy, The
Meaning of the American Revolution, (New Yorks The New
American Library, 1964), p. 67.
42Gilman Ostrander, The Rights of Man in America:
University of Missouri Press,

1606-1861, (Columbia, Mo:

1960), p. 12•

43Ibid, p. 41; Milton R. Konvitz, ed, Law and Social
Action: -selected Essays of Alexander H. PekeITs~New
York: Da Capo Press, 197:oY, p. 95.
-

...

I
I

l?
a half tradition that every government, from town to colony, was a self-governing commonwealth which was governed by
men who· were locally chosen and democratically elected.44
Although American revolutionary principles and practices were primarily a native development, the terms which
the Americans used to describe them were drawn from many
different-sources:

the political writers of ancient Greece

and Rome; European authors such as Bodin, Montesquieu, and
Pufendorf; the-English radicals of the mid-seventeenth
century; and the English ''Coffee House Radicals" of the
first half of the eighteenth century.

However, the autho-

rity against which theories, actions and events were measured was provided by the seventeenth century English Whig,
John Locke.

Indeed, by using selected passages from his

Second Treatise of Government,- it ·is possible to duplicate
almost the entire first section of Jefferson's Declaration
of Independence with much of the same language and style.45
Yet Locke, himself, did not originat-e the theories which he
did so much to popularize.
The theories of natural law and government by

~ompact

had originated in the political philosophies of Greece and
Rome and the political practices of the Germanic tribes
44Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, (New Yorks
Viking Press_, 1965), p.-Y75.
-. 45ostrander, .Q.£ cit, pp. 90...;91.

The
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which had overwhelmed the Western Roman Empire.

However,

these theories had been unable to compete successfully with
feudalism which developed as a reaction to the assaults of
the Norsemen and Magyars.

Nevertheless, they remained in

the background of European political thought and occasionally came to the fore, causing trouble for the ruling
classes.

Natural law was, for example, used by the leaders

of the Peasant's Revolts which shook the foundations of
feudal society throughout most of fourteenth century Europe,·
and in England nearly toppled the government and social
order.
But it was not until these theories were used during
the seventeenth century struggle against Stuart autocracy
that natural law and compact government became forces to
be reckoned

with.~

During the first phase, which ended with

the execution of Charles the First, natural law formed one
of the important elements in the argument for a more limited
monarchy.

However, once the Puritans gained-power7 they.

ruthlessly suppressed elements (such as the Diggers and the
Levellers) who advocated putting these ideas into practice.
Once the monarchy was restored in 1660, natural law again .
became an important argument for the opponents of unlimited
royal

prerogative~

Of all the radicals who wrote.in England from 1630 to
1690, the. most important·was ·John Locke.

Unti~ recently,

it was assumed that because his Two Treatises of Government
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were published in support of "The Glorious Revolution" of
1688, that Locke wrote to justify that event.

However, it

is now generally accepted that he wrote a decade earlier,
during the Exclusion Controversy, to justify an armed Whig
uprising.

This uprising never took place and the Whig

opposition collapsed after the failure of the "Rye House
Plot."

Locke was forced to hide his manuscript and flee to

exile in Holland.

Only when James the Second had been

driven from the throne, could he return and publish the
surviving portions of the Two Treatises as a defence of the
Revolution and the claim of William and Mary to the Crown.46
An exponent of individual rights, Locke held that
property (which he defined as life, liberty and those
things necessary for their preservation) existed prior to
the establishment of societies and governments.47

Indeed,

society and government had been specifically invented to
better protect the property ·or the individual and were
strictly limited to that end.4B_
According to this theory, all the world had once been
in a state of nature which resembled the conditions to be
46For the full story of Locke's work, See1 John
Locke, Two Treatises of Government with Introduction and
Notes by Peter Laslet't; revised edition, (New York: New
American Library, 1963), Introduction, pp. 1-170.
47J.W. Gough, John .. Locke's Political Philosophy,
(Oxford: The Clarendon-Press, 1950), p. 73.
48Locke, (Laslett, ed), .QE cit, p. 413.
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.

found in America.49

Into this primitive forest, God had

I.

placed man, whom He had created both reasonable and.rational

.

and had given him, in common, dominion over the earth and
the creatures upon it.50
While in the state of nature, conduct was governed by
the law of nature which was simply the law of reason.

No

man could destroy himself or any creature in his possession
except for his own preservation.

Further every man was

bound to def end the rest of mankind to the best .of his
ability and, except when punishing a criminal, forbidden to
"take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of
another."51

Even though all men were free from and equal

to each other in the state of nature, they were willing to
give up their freedom and equality for the states of society
and government.

The main

proble~

was -that the law of nature was
in the minds of .men.

with the state of nature

unwritten.~nd-was

Because.nf

·thi~,

foun<Lonly

it was.frequently.·

misapplied, and as every man-was his own judge,.interpreter.
and executioner, -it frequ-ently lead ·to conflict.-· Indeed,
even if a man was right in his interpretation of the law,
he had difficulty defending his position with only his own
49rbid, pp. 343.
50Ibid, pp. 328-332-.-. 51Ibid, p. 311.
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strength.52
To avoid the state of war which usually resulted from
the lack of any appeal

exc~pt

to heaven,

••• is one great reason of Men putting themselves
into Society and quitting the "State of Nature.
For where there is an Authority, a Power on Earth,
from which relief can be had by appeal there the
Controversie is decided by that Power.SJ
Everyone entering into the state of society, surrendered to society his

~'Executive

Power of the Law of Nature,"

that .is, .. the power to interpret the law, to be its judge i·n
his own case, and to punish criminals.

In return he was to

receive a set of known laws, fair and impartial judges and
the aid of his fellow citizens in defending his rightsl54
J.
But just because an individual entered into a

I

st~te

of society with some men, did not mean that the state of
nature or the law of nature ceased to exist.

Men always

remained in a state of nature with respect to all other
individuals except those with whom they

~hared·a

cummon

judge.55· In this respect, the subjects.· of' an absolute.··
monarch might be equal-to each other,. but they remained in
a state· of' nature with -their ruler -becaus-e .they ·had no
source .of appeal this side of' heaven ._.56
52Ibid~ p. 311.

53Ibid t .P. 404.
54rbrd:, .pp. 368:..369-.
55Ibid, p. 369 • .
56Ibid, pp. 370-371.
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members of society who were entrusted with the powers of
government subverted the law for their own gain, and justice
was unobtainable, then the compact was dissolved and the
people are absolved of any further obedience.5?
Because a man could only give up that portion of his
powers under the law of nature which tended to preserve himself and the rest of mankind, the powers of government were,
by definition:
••• limited to the public good of the Society.
It is a Power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have the right
to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish
the Subjects.58
Governments could only be founded upon the consent of
the people and in no other way.

Yet, because "the noise of

War" has "so great a part of the History of Mankind,"
consent is often ignored and conquest is thought of as an
origin of government.

"But

Conques~

is as far from setting

up any Government, as demolishing a House is from building a
new one in its place."
by rule by consent,

~o

Thus untiL rule by

~orce·

is replaced

.civil government could, in fact

exist.59
Once a compact was .made between the rulers:and the
ruled, it remained in force as long as rights and proper57Ibid, pp. 91-92.
58Ibid, pp. 401-403 •.

591bid, p. 431.
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·ties of the people were protected.

However, when the rulers

violated their trust, they might be resisted as often and

to whatever extent necessary to restore the compacts
Where the Body of the People, or any single Man
is deprived of their Right, or is under the Exercise of a power without right, and have no Appeal
on Earth, there they have a liberty to appeal to
Heaven, whenever they judge the Cause of sufficient moment •.• they have, by a Law antecedent and
paramount to all positive Laws of men reserv'd
that ultimate Determination to themselves, which
belongs to all Mankind, where there lies no
Appeal on Earth, viz. to judge whether they have
just Cause to make their Appeal to Heaven. And
this judgment they cannot part with it being out
of a Mans power to submit himself to another, as
to give him a liberty to destroy him; God and
Nature .never allowing a Man to so abap.don himself, as to neglect his own preservation: And
since he cannot take away his own life, neither
can be give another the power to take it. Nor
let anyone think this lays a perpetual foundation for Disorder: for this operates not till
the Inconvenience is so great that the Majority
feel it, and are weary of it~ and find a n~cessi ty to have it ammended ••• 6Y
·
Because the Two Treatises were published to support
William the Third's claim to the throne, they received a
degree of official acceptance which
been denied them.

otherwis~

Consequently, when

the colonies it was at

o~ce

Loc~e's

would have
book reached

accepted as a factual, rather

than theoretical, statement about the origin of government

I
I

and the rights of individuals.61

Locke's writings were an

I

61Andrew C. McLanghlin, A Constitutional History of
the United States, (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts,
1935), p. 93.

i·

*

60ibid, p. 426.

_;
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immediate success, particularly in the North American colonies where they appeared to confirm the native political
theories.
The breakdown of imperial authority in the colonies
after the passage of the so-called "Intolerable Acts" in
~774,

provided the test of the American committment to

their Lockean version bf natural law and government by compact.

Power, at all levels, was

ass~med

by extra legal

organizations (Committees' of Safety, Provincial Congresses, and the Continental Congress) which had no real
mandate other than that provided by the muskets of their
supporters.

In most other countries at most other times,

those groups who had seized power have simply kept it.
However, the American revolutionaries believed their own
rhetoric and the fact that their governments, though popu,,.,....-

1 a r in origin, had no real mandate from the governed people
at all levels of society.
On the "national level" power lay in the hands of the
Continental Congress which was basically an assembly of
"angry local politicians."62

Because it had no official

standing its actions were ignored by the British government.
Yet, almost from the very first, the Continental Congress
was forced by events to behave as if it were a legally
constituted though extremely.limited central government.
62Marshall Smelser, ~ Winning of Independence,
(New York: Quadrangle Books., 1972), p. 9.
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The First Continental Congress, like its predecessor
the Stamp Act Congress, was more representative of overall
colonial opinion than later Congresses.
cals, moderates and conservatives.

It contained radi-

Several of its members

were ultimately to decide that loyalty to the crown was
more important than largely theoretical colonial "rights."
Still it passed some strongly worded documents which fell
within the bounds of the eighteenth century definition of
treason:

it approved and published the inflammatory Suffolk

County "Resolves;"63 issued its own Declarations and Resolves which

inclu~ed

an unequivocal denial of Parliamentary

authority;64 and i~ declared economic warfare on the Mother
Country by adoptint the Continental Association.65
Later when the Second Continental Congress met, just
twenty.days after the Battle of Lexington and Concord, it
began to function as the national government.

It adopted

the army beseiging Boston,· authorized a· navy, appointed a
6Jnrafted by Dr. Joseph Warren, the resolves declared
that: rights of Massachusetts were based.on nature, that
the King's power was derived from compact, that the Intolerable Acts were a gross violation of American rights and
consequently obedience .was not required, trade with Great
Britain, Ireland and the West Indies.should stop, courts
and tax collectors should be ignored, and the people should
establish a popular militia and prepare the defensive war.
See: Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed, Journals of the Continental Congress, J4 vols. (Washington: Government Print-·
ing Office, 1904-1937), Vol. 1, pp. 31-39.
64rbid, Vol. 1, pp. 67-70.
65rbid, Vol. 1, pp. 75-80.
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Commander-in-Chief, printed money, engaged in international
diplomacy, and made laws defining treason against the United
Colonies.66
Throughout the fifteen year period during which it
acted as a central government, the Continental, Congress was
hampered by the fact that it had no mandate for the responsibilities which it had assumed.

It tried to remedy this

defect by passing the Articles of Confederation and submitting them to the new state governments for approval:
process which was blocked by Maryland until 1781.67

a
Yet the

nation under the Articles was little more than a league of
semi-independent states and Congress could do little more
than reason and plead.

Indeed, to the nationalists of the

mid-1780's, the greatest single defect of the Union under
the Articles was that it was based upon the action of state
legislatures alone.

Thus, while the responsibilities of the

Continental Congress increased dramatically from 1774 to
1786, its actual power remained approximately the same as
it was when the Continental Association was passed with the
hope that it would be enforced by local jurisdictions.
On the provincial level too, the revolutionaries were
faced with the problem of mandate.

After the collapse of

Royal authority, most colonies were governed by assemblies,
66smelser, .Q.E cit, p. 94.
67Journals, _QE cit, Vol. XIV, pp. 619-622.
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which were more or less popularly elected, under the
~authority"

of their colonial charter and with the execu-

tive "absent."

While this did allow government to function,

it was by no means a satisfactory solution to the problems
especially as the colonies drifted ever closer to independence.

In Massachusetts, for example, as early as December

26, 1775, the town of Pittsfield protested the resumption
by the General Assembly of the old colonial charter, which
had been· abolished by the Massachusetts Government
(May 20, 1774).

Act~

It demanded that government, both civil

and military, be reorganized along more democratic lines.
The town meeting protested that:
••• We have with Decency and Moderation attended
to the various Arguments of those Gentlemen
lately created our Rulers ••• in favor of re- .
assuming our antient Constitution .•• but ••• we are
of opinion that unlimited passive obedience and
Non-Resistance to any human power whatever is
what we are contending with Great Britain and to
transfer tha~ power to any other Body of Men is
equ~lly dangerous to our Security and happiness •••
We ••• shall be restless in our endeavor that we
may obtain the privilege of electing our Civil
and-Military officers. We assure your H9nors
that· some of those who-have been appointed to
rule us are greatly obnoxious to People in
General ••• If the right of nominating to office
is not invested in the people we are indifferent
who assumes ~t·~hether any particular persons
on this or the other side of the water.6~
Eventually, in the autumn of 1776, the government of
Massachusetts yielded to the petitions for constitutional
68Ricnard B. Morris, ed, The American Revolution:
(Columbia~ S.C.s
University of South Carolina
Press, 1970), pp. 290-293.
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reform.

However, instead of calling a constitutional

convention, the General Court proposed to ernpanel itself to
draft a constitution.

This action was protested by the

town of Concord which demanded an independent convention
whose work would be submitted to the people.69
••• First, because we conceive.that a Constitution
in its proper idea intends a system of principles
established to secure the subjects in the possession and enjoyment of their rights and privileges, against any encroachment of the governing
part. Second, because the same body that forms
a Constitution have of consequence a power to
alter it. Third, because a Constitution alterable by the Supreme Legislature is no security
at all to the subject against any encorachment
of the governing part on any or on all of their
rights and privileges.70
·
Ignoring this advice, the Massachusetts General Court
drafted a constitution to replace the colonial charter.
However, when they presented it for ratification by county
conventions, it was rejected for a variety of reasons:
inclu~ing

the

la~k

of a bill of rights and the fact.that it

had been written by members of the government.

In addition

to its negative vote, the Convention of Essex County included a lecture on· the origin and purpose of free government.
According to the convention's admonition, the supreme
power within society is composed of the collective powers
69samuel Eliot Morison, ed, Sources and Documents
Illustrating the Amerlcan Revolution 1764-1788 and the
Formation of the Federal Constitution, second edition,
1929, reprint:-TNew York: Oxford University Press, 1967),
pp. 176-177.
70Ibid, p. 177.
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of the individual members.

It ·can only be exercised by

government for the common good and " ••• ONLY WHEN THE GOOD
OF THE WHOLE REQUIRES it."

Any other use constitutes a

usurpation of power and the individual is not required to
obey.
so

Also," ••• ALLEGIANCE AND PROTECTION ARE RECIPROCAL"

that if the government fails to perform its duties the

people are absolved of their obligations.

Mo~eover,

when

framing a constitution which guarantees political honesty
and has an " ••• upright regard to the interests of the body
of the people and the civil rights of each individual •.• "
it is necessary to go to the people.

This is because" •••

the people have always a disposition to promote their own
happiness, and that when they have time to be informed, and
the necessary means of information given them they will be
able to determine upon the necessary measures therefor •• :71
Finally, in 1779, the Massachusetts General Court
gave in to popular pressure and called a convention·for the
sole purpose of drafting a constitution, which would then
be referred to the people.

The result was the Constitution

of 1780 which had an extensive Bill of Rights and which
lasted until the separation of Maine from Massachusetts
in 1820.
The experience of Massachusetts is of particular
irnportance'both because of the depth of p9litical knowledge

71 Morris,

.Q.12.

cit, pp. 313-315.
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among the electorate and for the innovation of the constitutional convention.

Moreover, each of the former colonies,

with the exception of Connecticut and Rhode Island whose
charters-were based on social compacts, went through the
constitution making process at least once.

Gradually the

concept was adopted that constitutions should be written
by bodies apart from the

gov~rnment

and that they should be

ratified by the people:

a principle which was to be adopted

nationwide by the late 1780's.
While the people of Massachusetts were engaged in
their protracted discussion about the proper foundation of
written constitutions, most of the other states were experimenting with constitutional forms.

Excluding Connecticut

and Rhode Island (which were governed under their social
compact colonial charters until 1818 and 1842 respectively)
the remaining eleven states collectively adopted nineteen
consti tut5.ons be'tween 1776 and 1800.

If Kentucky, Tennes-

see, and Vermont are added to the list, the number of state
constitutions adopted before the turn of the century jumps
to twenty-five.72

Twenty-three of these (the exceptions

are Georgia's second and third) contain explicit statements
of the peoples' right te rebel against arbitrary power.
Maryland's Constitution of 1776, for example, contained
a phrase which was later widely copied:
72 nelaware (2), Georgia {J), Kentucky (2), Massachusetts (1), Maryland (1), New Hampshire (3), New Jersey (1),
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The doctrine of non-resistance, against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, slavish,
and distructive to the good and happiness of
mankina.73
These statements began with the Virginia Declaration
of Rights which was adopted June 29, 177674 and remained a
vital part of the constitution-making process of the states
until well into the nineteenth century when natural law
theory was replaced by positive law theory.

New York (1), North Carol1na (1), Pennsylvania (2), South
Carolina (J), Tennessee (1), Vermont (J), Virginia (1), See:
Francis Newton Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions,
Colonial Charters, and .other Organic Laws of the States,
Territories, ~Colonies Now .21: Heretofore Forming The
United States of America, 7 vols. (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1909).

·nIbid,

Vol. J, p. 1987.

74Hezakiah Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America, (New York: A.S. Barnes & Co, 1876), pp.

301-303.

THE PATRIOT MILITIA 1774-1786
To enforce the Continental Association upon unwilling
Tories and neutralists as well as to prepare for an armed
struggle with the Mother Country, the Patriots needed a
force superior to that provided by organizations of the
type known as the Sons of Liberty.

Unlike most revolution-

ary movements, the Americans did not have to start from
scratch but were able to begin their struggle in control of
an organized military forces

the colonial militia.75

Thirty years of official neglect had permitted· the "more
respo~sible

men of the community" to purchase exemptions

from militia service with the result that the militia companies were

dominate~

by the "radical, and on occasion, more

irresponsible elements."76

Because these were precisely the

elements which already supported the struggle for·-colonial
rights, the extra-legal ·Prov-incial.
Committees.of Safety hadmilitia.

Congre_s~es

li~tle trouble.~aking

and the local
over the:.

They simply directed the men to resign from their

existing companies, form new units, and elect Patriots as
75Higginbothan,

.Ql2

ci t, __ p. 10.

76Lawrerice Henry -Gipson-, ·The British Isles and the
American Colonies:: The_ Northern Plantations, 1748-1754~
(New York: Alfred A:-Knopf, 1960), pp. 88-90.
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officers while excluding Tories.7(

This process of radi-

calizing the militia, was nowhere more important than in
Virginia because it involved so many of the men (Patrick
Henry, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, George Mason, Edmund
Pendleton and .George Washington, to name~a few) whose ideas
were to help shape the constitutional structure of the new
United States.
Beginning with local efforts, such as· the Fairfax
County Militia Association, the Virginians attempted to
create a force which could successfully resist regular
troops.

Written by George Mason, who later wrote the Vir-

ginia Declaration of Rights, the "Plan" was similar to one
adopted two months earlier in December 1774 by the Annapolis, Maryland Convention.78

In addition to simply detail-

ing organization and equipment, Mason included a statement
of intent which strictly conforms to natural. law and compact
government theory:
Threatened with the -Distruction -of our ancient
Laws and Liberty, and the Loss of all that is dear
to British Subjects and Freeman, justly alarmed
with the prospect of impending Ruin-firmly determined, at all hazard of our Lives, to transmit.
to our Children and Posterity those sacred Rights
to which ourselves were born; and thoroughly
convinced that a well regulated Militia, composed
of the Gentlemen, Freeholder, and other Freeman,
77Lee Nathaniel Newcomer, The Embattled Farmers: A
Massachusetts Countryside in the-=xroerican_Revolution, (New
York: King's Crown Press; 1953), p. 52.
78For the Maryland Plan, See: Hezakiah Niles,
Principles and Acts, .Q.E cit, pp. 260-262.
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is the natural Strength and only safe and stable
security of a free Government, and that such
Militia will relieve our Mother Country from any
Expense in our Protection and defence, will obviate the pretence of a necessity for taxing us

on that account, and render it unnecessary to

keep any standing Army (ever dangerous to
liberty (in this Co1:l~.ty, WE the subscribers,
Inhabitants of Fairfax County) have freely and
voluntarily agreed, and hereby do agree and
solemnly promise, to enroll and embody ourselves into a Militia for this County, intended
to Consist of all able-bodied Freeman from
eighteen to fifty Years of Age, under Officers
of their own Choice: and for that Purpose to
form ourselves in Readiness in case of Necessity, Hostile Invasion, or real Danger, to
defend and preserve to the utmost of our Power,
our Religion, the Law~ of our Country, and the
just Rights and Privileges of our fellowSubject, our Posterity and ourselves, u~on the
Principles of the English Constitution.Y9
A month later, the local efforts aimed at creating an
effective militia were transfered to the provincial level.
On March 23, 1775, Patrick Henry introduced a resolution
to the Virginia Provincial Convention, which he supported
with his "give me liberty or give me death"

spe~cha

Resolved, that a well regulated militia compos~
ed of Gentlemen. and yeomen is the .. natural ·
strength and only .security of .a free· ·g-overnment;
that such a militia would·forever·render it unnecessary for the mother country to keep among_ .
us, for the-purpose .of our defence, any standing
army of mercenary .forces, always· ·suhversi ve of
the quiet, and dangerous to the:liberties--0f the-~
people, and would obviate the· pretext of taxing.
us for their support.
That the establishing of such a militia is at
this time peculiarly necessary ••• in thi~ time

79R~bert A. Rutland, ed, The Papers of George Mason,·
· 3 vols.,· (Chapel Hill: The· University of North Carolina
Press, 1970), Vol. 1, pp. 215-216.
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of danger and distress ••• to s~cure our inestimable rights and liberties from those farther
violations with which they are threatened ••• 80
The results of this and other attempts to rejuvenate
the militia have been the subject of debate ever since.

In

particular, the militia system has been blamed {primarily
by professional army officers, who until recently, have
dominated military writing in the United States) for every
military mistake and disaster that occurred.

However, more

objective analysts have concluded that most of the failures
of the militia were caused by its misuses

as, for example,

when militiamen whq generally lacked bayonetts, were expected to withstand a bayonett charge by the British who made
a fetish of "cold steel;"Bl or from abuse·, as when exemptions from militia service were treated as political
favors.82
The militia during the Revolution performed best when
80Niles, .Q.E cit, pp. 277-280; At the same time, a
Militia Committee was appointed which immediately (Mar9h ··
24) reported back with a plan basically the same as that of
the-Fairfax County Association. It was read, amended, and
adopted on March 25, 1775. See: Julian P. Boyd, ~d,.The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 10 vols. to date, (Princeton
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), Vol. 1, pp. 160161. For Patrick Henry's "Liberty or death" speech, -See·:
Niles, .2£ cit, pp. 277-280.
81Brigadier· Peter Young, George Washington's Army,
(New York: Hippocrene Books, ~nc~ 1973), p. 33; So keenly
was the-lack of bayonetts:f~lt among the Americans, that
some years: iater,-1500 US Mode1·1795 muskets were manufactured with their bayonetts permanantly fixed. Sees Major
James·E. Hicks, U.s·~ Military_Firearms: 121Q.-12.5.Q,
{LaCanada, Calif: James Hicks & Son, 1962T~--pp. 16-17.
82Journals, .QB cit, Vol. VII, p. J4J.
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drawn from areas where Patriot sentiment predominated and
where the militia laws were fairly and evenly enforced.

In

addition, it was most aggressive when defending its home
district and was commanded by officers it trusted and who
understood it.

Indeed, a fact that is often overlooked is

that the local militia won several important victories,
such as Breed's Hill, More's Creek Bridge, King's Mountain,
Bennington, and Oriskany, alone or with only token help
from the Continental Army.BJ

It's existence ~eant that any

British force which moved away from its fortified base was
in grave danger of being overwhelmed, not by the Continental Army, but by swarms of hostile militia.84

However, the

most immediate tasks of the Patriot militia were to prevent
the Tories from organizing a counter revolution,85 and to
fill out the Continental Army before a battle, and, in the
early years, to hoid the line between the dissolution of
one army and the c~eation of its replacement.86
Throughout the War for Independence, much was recom83Jim Dan Hill, "The National Guard in Civil Dis- ·
orders: Historical Precedents," in Robin Higham, ed,
Bayonetts in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil
Disturbances,--U:awrence: The University Press of Kansas,
1969), pp. 61-84 (69-70) •.
8~John Richard Alden, General_Gage in America, (Baton

Rouge:

Louisiana State University, 1948), p. 88.
85Millis, Arms and Men, .QE cit, pp. 34-35.
86Ibid, p. Jl.
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mended and little was accomplished to strengthen the militia.

Until the final ratification of the Articles of

Confederation in 1781, the Continental Congress had no

•

authority whatsoever over the matter.

The states were

concerned with the problem that if they enforced the militia laws properly; they would be arming Tories as well as
Pa~rfots.

muskets.

Then too there was a shortage of both money and
As a result, by the end of the war most of the

militia east of the Appalachian Mountains was virtually
disarmed.87

Only after peace was secured could serious

attention be given to the problem of military reorganization.
Early in 1783, the Continental Congress appointed a
military committee which included three men (Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and James Wilson) who would be of
great

impo~tance

in the movement for constitutional reform

in the closing years of the decade.

The Committee's first

act was to dispatch a letter to General Washington requesting his assistance and views.88

Then the Committee turned

its attention to the problem of the Continental Army.
87Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh, ed, The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 20 vols., (Washingtons The
Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903-1904), Vol. II,
pp. 123-126.
88Harold C. Syrett, ed, ~ Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, 8 vols., (New York: Columbia University Press,
1961-1965), Vol. VIII, p. 322.
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A combination of boredom and lack of pay had resulted
in a few scattered strikes or "mutinies" and a deputation
of officers had presented Congress with a list of complaints.89

Even though the situation lacked the potential

for a military coup of the type which had made Cromwell
Lord Protector, it appeared serious enough to give Congress
~

a good case of republican jitters.

Deciding, however, that

the real danger lay in men deserting enmass, before a peace
treaty was secured, the Committee took steps to assure that
the army would be paid.

In addition, it recommended that

the non-commissioned officers and men should be given their
issue weapons and

accou~rements

in.an attempt to keep the

army in being.90
On May 2, 1783, General Washington sent the Military
CQmmittee ~is "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment."91
Drawing

up~n

both his own experience and that of his staff,

th~ Cornman~er-in-Chief recommended a six point program consisting of:

first, a small standing army (between 2500 and

JOOO officers and men) to guard the :frontiers, and "for the
89William T. Hutchinson and William M.E. Rachal, ed,
The Papers of James Madison, 8 vols. to date, (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1962-), Vol. VI, pp.

32-33.

90Journals, .Q.E.cit, pp. 269-270.
91John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, The Writings of George
Washington, 39 vols., (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1931-1944), Vol. 26, pp. 374-398.
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security of our Magazines;" second, "A well organized Militia; upon a Plan that will prevade all the States, and
introduce similarity in their Establishment, Manoeuvres,

Exercise and Arms;" third, establishment of national Arsenals; fourth, establishment of military "Accademies, one or
more" for the Instruction of the Art Military; fifth,
"Manufactories of some kinds of Military Stores," and
sixth, a Navy.92
Then on the subject of a standing army Washington
wrotes
Altho' a large standing Army in time of Peace
hath ever been considereq dangerous to the
liberti~s of a Country, yet a few Troops, under
certain circumstances, are not only safe, but
indispensably necessary. Fortunately for us our
relative situation requires but few ••• we are too
poor to maintain a standing Army adequate to our
defense, and was our Country more populous and
rich, still it could not be done without great
oppression of the people.93
With regard to the militia, Washington believed that
"this great Bulwark of our Liberties and independence"

m~st

be made to "appear truly respectable in the Eyes of our
Friends and formidable to those who would otherwise become
our enemies."

Only then could the United States reasonably

expect to be free from "insult or hostility ••• and ••• the
consequent calamities of War."

To achieve this every

citizen between 18 and 50 years (with a few legal exemp92Ibid, Vol. 26, pp. 374-376.
93Ibid, Vol. 26, p. 375.

40

tions) should be enrolled in the militia, armed with weapons of the same pattern" ••• and so far accustomed to the use
of them, that the total strength of the Country might be
called forth at a short Notice on any very interesting
Emergen~y."

In order to assure that the militia would not

again be allowed to deteriorate, there should be at least
-

one or two general musters each year at which the militiamen would.have their arms and accoutrements inspected and
at which they would receive some training.94
••. But as it is obvious that amongst such a Multitude of People (Who may indeed be useful for temporary domestic Circumstances, bodily defects, natural awkwardness or disinclination, can never ac. quire the habits of Soldiers •.• and as there are
a sufficient proportion of able bodied young men,
between the Age of 18 and 25, .•. that the former,
. being as a denier resort, reserved for some great
occasiqn, a judicious system might be adopted for
forming and placing the latte~ on the best possible Establishment ••• a kind of Continental Militia ••• 95
On June 18, 1783, the Military Committee issued its
report.

Noting that Article 9 Clause 5 of the Articles

of Confederation gave Congress the power to set-the number
of land forces, to establish state quotas, and to make
requisition of troops without mentioning either war or
94rbid, Vol. 26, p. 389. These statements were
echoed about a month later in Washington's circular letter
to the governors of the states which announced his retirement: "The militia of this country must be considered as
the palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility." Ibid, Vol. 26, p. 494.
95Ibid, Vol. 26, p. 389.
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peace, the Committee recommended an

e~pandable

which would consist of 3034 officers and

regular army

men.~n

peacetime

and 6068 in War.
Again the main reliance was to be placed on the militia, this time emboding all free white males between 20 and

50 who were to be divided into two classess
married.

single and

The single men were to be assembled "for inspec-

tion and exercise once in two months by companies and once
in four months regimentally," while the married men were to
be mustered once every three months by companies and once
every six months by regiments.

In the event of war alter-

nate halves of first the single corps followed by alternate
halves of the married corps were to serve for a year (at
the end of four years, assuming that the war lasted that
long, the rotation would begin again).

Eacn cla~s was to

be organized into corps of infantry and dragoons according
to their inclination and financial ability.

In addition,

there was to be a third class raised from volunteers in the
towns and cities .(not exceeding a proportion of one in
fifty of the rest of the militia) known "as fencibles,
fussileers, trainbands or whatever else may be· thought
proper."

This "Continental

Militi~"

would be organized as

infantry and would be furnished with arms, equipment and
uniforms and would be paid at the same rate as the regular
troops.

It would be enlisted for eight years and be per-

mitted to keep its weapons upon discharge.

Unlike the
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general militia it was obligated to serve three years in
time of war and could be marched anywhere within the United
States.96
Before submitting their Plan to the Congress, ·the
Military Committee sent a copy to Washington for his comments.97

In replying the general wrote that while he could

accept most of the, Plan, "the general outlines for the Establishment of a national Militia do not seem ••• so well
calculated to answer the object ••• as could be wished."

The

idea of a separate select corps raised in the towns and
cities "will not afford that prompt and efficacious resistance to an Enemy, which might be expected from ••• Light
Infantry Companies, or a general selection of the ablest
Men from every Regt. or Brigade of
the Mode I had formerly the honor
the Companies •.

~of

the late War ••• "98

l

I
I
j

I
I
I

Mil~tia

~o

in either of

propose .••• (or as) •••

Minute Men did at the Commencement of
However, the Committee chrise to issue

its report as written and on October 23, 1783, five days
after the disbanding of the Continental Army, it was submitted to Congress.99
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental
96syrett, .QI?. cit, Vol. ·3, pp. 378-397; Journals,
.QJ2 cit, Vol. 25, pp. 722-744.
97Fitzpatrick, ~cit, Vol. 27, pp. 140-144.
98Ibid, Vol. JO, p. 647~
99Journals,

.Q.E

cit, Vol. 25, p. 722.
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Congress could only recommend the plan to the state legislatures which showed little inclination to adopt the proposed system.

Nor was anytning constructive accomplished

until 1786 when the Congress directed Secretary for War
(as he was known under the Articles of Confederation),
Henry Knox to prepare a plan to place the militia on "a
respectable and effective footing ••• "

In the course of his

work, Knox drew heavily upon the work of the 1783 Military
Committee, Washington's Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," a·plan prepared by General Steuben in 1784, the
Ancient Greek and Roman military structure, the Swiss militia system, and the Anglo-American military history and
~radition.

This plan was completed and passed by Congress

on September 11, 1786.100
Even though the States, as usual, took no action upon
the recommended plan, it is important 1 because it was sent
to James Madison for use at the Constitutional Convention
in 1787.101

Also, it was submitted to the new Congress by

President Washington in 1790, with only minor rno4ifications
such as a reduction in the period of training.102

Although

never adopted, one American military historian has asserted
100 Ibid, Vol. 'JO, p. 647.
lOlEdmund C. Burnett, ed, Letters of Members of the
Continental Congress, 8 vols., (Washington: Carnegie~
Institution of Washington, 1921-1936), Vol. 8, p. 489.
102John McAuley Palmer, American in Arms: The
Experience of the United States with MiIItar=y-organization,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 4o.
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that it served the United States as the theoretical basis
for "all reserve policy down to 1917, if not to 1940."lOJ
While the plan was generally well received in

theory, its supporters were dubious about its chances.

On

March 12, 1786, David Ramsay wrote Secretary Knox praising
his plan as a deterent against aggression.

At the same

time, however, he. expressed grave doubts about both the
time and expense involved in its implementation and feared
that the State governments would reject it on those
accounts.104

Some months later, Henry Lee sent a copy of

the plan to James Madison.who had left Congress (to prepare for the constitutional convention) before its passage.

In his covering letter, Lee.praised the plan as one

well adapted to the defense of the nation.

But, lamenting

over the eight months of inaction which had.followed its
recommendation to the states, he expressed doubts that,
under the existing system of government, it would ever be
adoptea.105

103walter Millis, ed, American Military Thou~ht,
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc, 19 6),
pp. 60-61.
104Burnett, .QE cit, Vol. 8, p. 321.
105Ibid, Vol. 8, p. 489.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE MILITIA 1787-1813
By and large, the old Radicals such as Thomas
Jeffer~on,

Patrick Henry, and Thomas Paine who

governm~nt

and who wished to limit it severely, either did

distrust~d

not seek or refused to serve as delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 178?.

This meant that the proceed-

ings were dominated by men who believed that government
was a necessary and positive instrument of society.

They

believed, as James Wilson told the Convention, that bad
governments were.of two sorts:

those which did too little

and failed through weakness; and those which did too much
and destroyed through oppression.106

Their problem, as .

they saw it, was to strike a balance between the two
extremes.
Moreover, in their search for a form -0f government,
most of the members of the Convention were not overly · ·
concerned with proclaiming individual.rights.· Rather

~hey

believed that government, in the words of Roger Sherman1
••• is instituted for those who live under it.
It ought therefore to be so constituted as not
to be dangerous to their liberties ••. The
question is not what rights naturaliy belong
to men; but how they may be most equally and
106James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal
Conventton of .!.l§l·with an Introduction bY-Adrienne Koch,
(New York: -W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 1969), p. 222.
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effectually guarded in Society ••• 107
In an attempt to keep the new government from becoming oppressive, the authors of the Constitution

de~ignated

the militia as the primary instrument of law enforcement
and defense.108

Then to prevent either the states or the

central government from gaining control of the militia,
~

the Framers divided the administrative authority between
the two levels of government.109

The states retaining the

responsibility· for training the militia and for commissioning the officers; while the Congress was to arm,
organize and discipline the militia.110
These three federal functions were then defined for
the Convention by Rufus King of the Committee which had
prepared them (King also had been on the Military Committee of the Continental Congress when the Knox Plan had
been drafted) as meaning:

proportioning the officers and

men; specifying the kind, size and caliber of weapons;
prescribing such

organization~l

matters as the manual of

arms, field exercises and close order drill.

Then in

answer to questions, he added:
••• That arming meant not only to provide uniformity of arms, but included authority to
107Ibid, pp. 195, 208.

108Article One, Section Eight, Clause Fifteen.
109Millis, Arms and Men,

~nd

.Q.E

cit, p. 48.

110Article One, Section Eight, Clause Fifteen.
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regulate the modes of furnishing, either by
the Militia themselves, the State Govennments,
or the National Treasury: that "laws" for
qisciplining must involve penalties·and every
thing necessary for enforcing penalties.111
Speaking· in support of this article, James Madison
declared thats
The primary objective is to secure an effectual discipline of the Militia. This will no
more be done if left to the States separately
than the requisitions have been hitherto paid
by them. The States neglect their Militia
now, and the more they are consolidated into
one nation, the ·less each will rely on its .
own interior provisions for its safety and
the less prepared its Militia for that purpose; ••• The Discipline of the Militia is evidently a National concern, and ought to be
provided for in the National Constitution ••• 112
Madison's ·position was supported by his fellow
Virginian, Edmund Randolph, who observed "that the Militia
were every where neglected by the State Legislatures, the
members of which courted popularity too much to enforce· a

I
~

proper discipline ..... 113
While the mili.tia· clause passed,-. object-ions tu -it
and to the power -0f Congress to "raise_ and support Armies"

I

I! .

were revived toward the end. of the proceedings.

This

latter provision had.already been criticized as implying
that there was to be a standing army· of
111Madison, .212 cit, p •.513 •
112Ibid, pp. 514~515.
113Ibid, p. 515.

unlimi~ed

size in
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time of peace; while its supporters defended it as necessary because Congress was to be elected biannually and
might not be in session to renew an annual appropriation
Finally, on September 14,

in the case of an emergency.114

three days before the close of the Convention, George
Mason proposed what he hoped would be a compromise.

Ac-

-

cording to James Madison's recollection, Mason wass
••• sensible that an absolute prohibition of
standing armies in time of peace might be unsafe, and wishing at the same time to insert
something pointing out and guarding against the
danger of them, moved to preface the clause •••
'To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia & C' with the words 'And
that the liberties of the people may be better
secured against the danger of standing armies
in time of peace.•115
·
Edmund Randolph seconded the motion and Madison spoke in

I

favor of it.

I

vo~~.

I

However when the question was put to the

it carried.only the Virginia

an~

Georgia delegations.

In spite of several attempts to alter its military
articles, . the. Constitution was
adopted by the Convention
.
with little
drafts:

l

substa~tial.change

in the

~r~ginal

committee

Congress was empowered, but not specifically

.

directed, to arm, organize and discipline the militia;
while, at the same time, it was given
a virtually unquali,
fied power to raise a standing army.
114Madison, .Q.E cit, p. 580.
115Ibid, p. 639.

Moreover, the proba-

49
bility of effective

mil~tia

reform was hampered by divi-

ding authority between the national and state governments.
These features, combined with the lack of a bill of rights,
caused a small revolt among the delegatess

Elbridge

Gerry, George Mason, and Edmund Randolph followed the lead
of Luther Martin (who had already left the Convention in
~

protest) and refused to sign the completed Constitution.
Once the proposed new Constitution was published, it
was met with a storm of criticism from a loose coalition
of old Radicals and disillusioned Nationalists jointly
known as Anti-Federalists.

Generally their objections·

centered around the lack of a bill of rights and specifically about the dangers of the military articles which
they felt gave the national government the power to destray the militia by neglect while it raised a standing
l

army.

Alexander Hamilton and James Madison (together with
~

John Jay) attempted to answer these and other criticisms
in a series of essays (all signed Publius) which collectively have become known as the Federalist Papers.116

I
II
l
~

With regard to the general problem, Hamilton wrote
that bills of rights were by definition, grants of privi-

lege to subjects by rulers.

Hence they were unnecessary

in a constitutional system founded upon the authority of
·the people and in which the governors were their "repre-

__

116Ibid , pp. 639-640.
.

,
I

I
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sentatives and servants" rather than their masters.

Fur-

ther, such documents represented a danger becauses
••• They contain various exceptions to powers

i'•

r
I

not granted; and on this very account, would

afford a colorable pretext to claim more than
is granted. For why declare that thi~gs small
not be done which there is no power to do?
••• it is evident that it would furnish, to men
disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for
claiming that power ••• that the provision against restraining ••• liberty ••• affords a clear
implication that the power to proscribe proper
regulations concerning it was intended to be
vested in the national government ••• 1.17
The greatest safety lay in the facts
••• that the whole·power of the proposed government. is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people. This is the essential,
and ••• only effecacious s~curity for the rights
.of the people which is attainable in civil
society.
If the representatives of the people betray
their constituents, there is then no recourse
left but in the exertion of that original right
of self-defence ~hi~h is paramount to all positive forms .of government.~.The citizens must
rush tumultuously to arrns ••• 11 8
~
Then in another of the Fed era.list Papers, Hamil ton
argued for giving the power to organize, arm and discipline the militia to the federal government as a further
check on the development of tyranny:
••• If a well-regulated militia be the most
natural defence of a free country, it ought

certainly to be under the regulation and at the
117Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay,
The Federalist Papers with an Introduction, Table of Contents and Index of Ideas, by Clinton Rossiter, (New Yorks
The New American Library, 1961'}.
118rbid, ·PP. iso-182.
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disposal of
guardian of
(However)
the militia
as it would

that body which is constituted the
the national security ••• ·
the prospect of disciplining all
of the United States is as futile
be injurious if it were capable

of being carried into execution.

A tolerable

expertness in military movements is a business
that requires time and practice. It is not a
day, or even a week, that will suffice for the
attainment of it. ·To oblige the great body of
the yoemanry and of the other classes of citizens to be under arms for the pur~ose of going
through military exercises and evolutions, as
often as might be necessary to acquire the
degree of prefection which would entitle them
to the character of a well-regulated militia,
~ould be a real grievance to the people and a
serious public inconvenience and loss ••• Little
more can reasonably be aimed at with respect
to the people at large than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see
that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the
course of a year ••• This will not only lessen
the call for military establishments, but if
circumstances should at· any time oblige the
government to form an army of any magnitude
that army can never be formidable to the
liberties of the people while there is a large
body of citizens, little if at all inferior to
them in discipline and the use of arms, who
stand ready to defend their own rigbts and
those of their fellow citizens ••• 1~9
To these sentiments, Madison added that according to
the best calculations the largest standing army which
could be supported in any country did not exceed "one
hundreth part of the whole number of souls; or one twentyfifth part of the number able to

~ear

arms."

Applying

this formula to the population of the United States, this
119Ibid, pp. 183-185.
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army would not exceed twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
Opposing these would be.a militia of "near half a million
of citizens with arms in their hand, officered by men
chosen from themselves, fighting for their common liberties."

That such a militia could ever be defeated by that

proportion of regulars is to be doubted, especially by
those who are familiar with the course of the War for
Independence.

"Besides the advantage of being armed,

which the Americans possess over the people of almost
every other nation,"

~hey ar~

also in the possession of

local, popularly elected governments which form an additional barrier to ambition.120
However, the Anti-Federalists were unconvinced by
such arguments.

To them, the

propose~

new government

looked too much like the old imperial system.

While there

was little organized interstate action for or against
Ratification, the general course of debate was the same.
- The Anti-Federalists criticized the lack of a bill of
rights of the type which formed such a prominent part of
the radical state constitutions and feared that the military articles of the Constitution would inevitably lead to
the replacement of the militia by a standing mercenary
army.121

While there were many arguments made in support

120Ibid, pp. 299-300.
121Higginbothan, .Q.E. cit, p. 458.

..
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of this point at the state ratifying conventions, one of
the best summaries was formulated by John Taylor of Virginia and later published as part of a book on American
constitutional theory and practices
Arms can only be controlled by arms, An armed
nation only can keep up an army, and also maintain its liberty. The constitution of the
United States, overlooking this undeniable
truth, has placed both the raising of an army,
and the arming of the militia, among the potential attributes of the general government.;
whereas the first belongs to the principle of
accumulation and the latter to the principle of
division. One therefore, is a power, and the
other a check.upon that power. One is a foe,
and the other a friend of liberty. One
strengthens the government; the other the
nation. And a sound militia make a government·
dependant on the nation; a bad one, a nation
dependant on a government. An armed militia
divides the power to raise mercenary armies;
wherefore governments, which can raise armies,
will seldom be inclined to arm the militia •••
An Armed nation only can protect its government
against an army. Unarmed, and without an army,
a nation invites invasion. Unarmed and with an
army, it invites usurpation. A standing army
of mercenary civil officers, being as fatal to
a free government, as an army of soldiers, the
militia principle may be as useful and necessary.in the one case as the other ••• 122
Faced with the possibility that their new Constitution would be either rejected out of hand or crippled by
amendments, the Federalists yielded to the call for the
inclusion of a bill of rights.

Once this point had been

conceded, ratification was quickly accomplished with most
states adding lists of suggested alterations to their
122Taylor, .QI?. cit, pp. 159-161, 499.
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returns.
While there was no specific agreement as to whether
the amendments should be organized as a separate section
or be incorporated into the body of the text, there was
general agreement about the type of changes which could
be made:

civil rights such as free speech and trial by

jury should be protected; there should be a statement that
government was formed by

compac~

and that the people re-

tained the power of altering or abolishing it at will;
and finally, there should be a guarantee that the militia
would not be replaced by a standing army and that the
people's right to keep and bear arms would be protectea.123
Yet of all the recommendations for change in the
Constitution, those of the Virginia Convention were perhaps the most important.

Not only did these debates in-

clude such well known Anti-Federalists as George Mason,
Patrick Henry, and Richard Henry Lee, but it also included James Madison who introduced the subject of amendment
to the First Congress.

The Virginians wanted:

••• a declaration or bill of rights asserting,
and securing from encroachment, the essential
and unalienable rights of the people, in some
such manner as the following123The New Hampshire Convention went so far as wanting an article which stated that "Congress shall never
disarm any Citizen unless such are or have been· in Actual
Rebellion," Documentary History of the Constitution of the
United States, 3 vols. (Washington: Department of State,
1894-1900), Vol. II~ p. 143.
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1st. That there are certain natural rights of
which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity; among
which are the enjoyment of life and liberty,
and the means of acquiring, possession, and protecting property, and obtaining happiness and
safety •.
2nd. That all power is naturally invested in,
and·consequently derived from, the people; that
magistrates therefore are their trustees and
agents; ·at all times amenable to them,
3rd. That government ought to be instituted
for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people; and that the doctrine of
non-resistance against arbitrary power and
oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive
to the good and happiness of mankind •••
17th. That the people have a right to keep and
bear arms; that a well regulated militia, composed of the body.of the people trained to arms,
is the proper, natural and safe defence of a
free state·; that standing armies, in time of
peace, are dangerous to liberty, and therefore
ought to be avoided, as far as.the circumstances
and protection of the community will admit; and
that in all cases, the military should be under
strict subordination to, and governed by, the
civil power ••• 124
Two of the major items of business which faced the
First Congress when it assembled in New York were the
related subjects of constitutional amendment and military
reform.

Had these been accomplished in the manner antici-

pated, they would have had the effect of transforming the
Federal Constitution into a document similar to the radical state constitutions and of placing the military power
124Jonathan Elliot, ed, The Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the AdoptIOn of the Federal Constitution of 1787 Together with the Journal of the Federal
Convention, 5 vols., (Philadelphias JB Lippincott
Company; 1901), Vol. III, pp. 657-659.
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of the nation firmly in the hands of the people.
Constitutional amendment, as originally introduced
by James Madison would have resulted in a rewriting of the

document.

To begin with, a preface would have been added

stating that:
••• all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the People. That
Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the People; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the rights of acquiring and using property, and
generally pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or
change their Government, whenever it be formed
adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its
institution ••• 125
This was followed by a proposed series of alterations and
additions to the text which were calculated to protect
various rights such as:

freedom of religion, press and

speech; assembly and petition; and trial by jury.

Then,

with regard to the military, Madison suggested that.
Article I Section 8 Clause 16 should be prefaced with the
statement that:
The Rights of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed; a well armed and well
regulated militia being the best security of a
free country: but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled
to render military service in person .•• 126
125Joseph Gales, Senior, ed, The Annals of Congress,
18 vols., (Washington:. Gales and Seaton, 1834-1856),
Vol. I, p. 452.
126Ibid, Vol. I, 'p. 452.
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While the concept of amending the Constitution was
accepted by the First Congress, the idea of altering the
text was not.

Eventually, it was decided to drop the pre-

face and put the changes at the end of the document.127
Finally twelve amendments· were passed by the Congress of
which ten (including the present Second) were adopted by
the states.
While they were going through the motions of producing a bill of rights, the Federalists introduced a
slightly modified version of the Knox Militia Plan which
had been passed by Congress in 1786.

Its purpose as

stated in its introduction was to create a system of
defence which could be:

•
•l

••. adequate to the probable exigencies of the
United States whether arising from internal or
exte~nal causes; and at the same.time to erect a
standard of republican magnanimity, independent
of, and superior to, the powerful influences of
weal th •••
The idea is therefore --submitted, whether an
effective military branch of Government ·can· be
invented, with safety to the great principles
of liberty, unless the same -shail be ~armed -of
the people themselves and supported by their
habits and manners •••
An energetic national ~ili.tia-_ i.s _to be regarded as the capital .security of a free·
Republic; and not a standing army, forming a
distinct class in the community.
It is the introduction and diffusion of vice
and corruption of mannefs into the mass of the
127unfortunately attempts to follow the progress of
the Bill of Righ~s-~hrough Congress are hampered by the fact that the ·records are incomplete and in some cases inaccurate. Julius Geobel, Jr, History of the Supreme Court
of the United States, 1 vol. to date, (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1971-), Vol. 1, p. 102.
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people, that renders a standing army necessary. It is when public spirit is despised,
and avarice, indolence, and effeminacy of
manners predominate, and prevent the establishment of institutions which would elevate
the minds of the youth in the paths of virtue

and honor, that stanging army is formed and
riveted forever ••• 12

·

.

Knox felt, however, that to supplement "(a)n energetic national militia," which he "regarded as the cap}tal
security of a free Republic," a small regular army
(appro~imately

J,000 men) would be necessary "for the

protection of the frontiers, and the magazines and arsenals."

These regulars would.

b~

prevented from "forming a

distinct class in the community" by enlisting them for
definite periods after which they were "to be returned to
the mass of. the citizens."
The militia, itself, was to consist of all free
white males between eighteen and sixty (minus the usual
occupational exemptions) and were to be divided into three
classes:

the

~dvanced

corps composed of the young men

aged 18 through 20; the main corps consisting of men 21
through 45; and the reserve corps aged 46-60.

In addition

"(a)ll actual mariners or seamen" were to be divided into
two classes:

16 to JO and 31 to 45 years.

The first

class was to be liable to serve three years in a shi.p of
war and the second class to serve "as needed" in the same
manner as the land militia.
128Annals, .QE cit, Vol. 2, p. 2141-2146.
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While serving in the advanced c9rps, militiamen
would be obligated to attend three annual encampments (JO
days in each of his first two years and 10 days in his
third year).

Then, upon turning twenty-one, the militia-

man passed from the advanced to the main corps.

This

training process would assure thats
••. the republic receives disciplined and free
citizens, who understand their public rights,
and are prepared to defend them.
The main corps is instituted to preserve and
circulate throughout the community the military
discipline acquired in the advanced corps; to
arm the people; and to fix firmly, by practice
. and habit, those forms and maxims which are
essential to the life and energy of a free Government .129
While the Second Amendment became a part of the
Constitution, it failed to preserve the Militia from further decay.

The Knox Plan, which had been resubmitted to

the First Congress and which would have provided the
organization and arms for an effective militia systemfailed partly because Henry Knox lacked the tact of Alexander Hamilton who argued the Federalist case for economic
reform.130
It was not until 1792 that a national Militia Act
was passea.131

At first glance, this law would appear to

129Ibid, Vol. 2, pp. 2146-2161.
130Palmer, .Q.E cit, pp. 43-44.
131statutes at Large Vol. 1, Chapter J4, pp. 271274, May 8, 1792, "An Act more effectually to provide for

,
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l

be extremly comprehensive, specifying down to the last
spare gun flint and cartridge the .arms and ammunition that
every free white male was required to possess.

However,

during the legislative process every feature of construe-

'

tive reform, through which compliance with the law could
be assured, was amended out, and, in the end, its sponsor
voted against it.132

-

With everything left to the states

and no provision for checking returns, the Militia Act of
1792 spawned a largely non-existant paper "army greater
than that which massed against Napoleon."133

Ineffectual

as it was, it nonetheless remained the law of the land
for 111 years until it was replaced by the Military Reorganization Act of 1903.
Periodically, over the succeeding two decades,
attempts were made to compensate for the shortcomings of
the Militia Act of 1792.

Finally, on the eve of the War

of 1812, two bills were introduced into Congress:

one of

these revived the idea that the militiamen should be divided into classes by age and marital status and held
responsible for varying degrees of service; the other
the national defence by establishing a uniform militia

throughout the United States."

This Act, though never en-

forced, remained on the books until repealed on January 21,
1903; Statutes at Large, Vol. 32, Pt. 1, pp. 775-780,
Chapter 196, "An Act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes."
132Palmer,

.Q_:2

cit, pp. 50-51.

----

133Millis, Arms and Men, op cit, p.

52.
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would have provided every free white male with a stand of
arms (muskett, bayonett, cartridge box, and other basic
equipment), at public expense, when he reached the age
of eighteen years.

In favor of this latter provision, it

was saids

l

j.

I
I

I
j

I

•.• that it having been provided by the constitution, 'the right of the people to keep and
Bear Arms shall not be infringed,' it was the
duty of Congress to provide them, as if it were
left to the people themselves, experience had
shown, that some citizens will provide themselves with· arms and some will not ••• Besides,
more strictly complying with the constitutional
provision ••• Having them in possession, they
would be ready for any e~ergency which might
occur •••
When the nation ·shall be thus armed ••• who
will dare to molest us? The country will be
safe from any enemy within or without. The government would have nothing to fear from a standing army, or an ambitious military chief. A
well-informed people, understanding their rights,
with ~rms in their hands, cannot be subdued.
They are invulnerable. And being the real sovereigns of the country, government has nothing
to fear ~rom them; because the government is,
and will be, at all times, what they please to
make it ••• Give the Reople but arms ••• and the
Republic ~s safe.13
Unfortunately for the supporters of militia reform,
these two bills were considered together.

They passed the

House of Representatives but they failed by two votes
the Senate.

in

Still, several of the Senators who voted

against the two bills, stated that they would vote for the
provision for arming the militia if it were to be submit-

1025).

134Annals, op cit, Vol. 12, pp. 1021-1029 (1023- --
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ted separately from the question of classifying the militiamen.
Before the subject of militia reform could be reconsidered, however, the War of 1812 intervened.

While

both the militia and the regular army performed indifferently during that conflict, it was the former which received most of
land war.

th~

blame for the disastrous course of the

Later, reformers would, without much success,

point out that the cause of the poor performance of the
militia had been government neglect in peacetime, and that
not only was the militia ill-equipped and poorly trained,
but the

militiam~n

were, by and large, unenfranchised and

thus reluctant to fight for a
l

I.

governmen~

which neglected

them and in which they had little confidence.135

Although

!
I

the War of 1812 ended all

seri~us

attempts at reform, the

fiction of a universal militia system continued for
another quarter of a century when it collasped completely
at the outbreak of the Mexican·War.i36

l35chilton Williamson, American_Sufferage:. From
ProEerty to Democrac*, 1760-1860, (Princeton1 Princeton
University Press, 19 0), pp. 188-&·227.
l36Harry A. Marion, Selective Service: Conflict and
Compromise, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1968),
p.

56.

CONCLUSION1

THE FAILURE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

The Second Amendment failed because the political
philosophy upon which it was based was discarded.

Within

a generation the new American government abandoned the
· ideals137 of American revolutionary theory for their antithesis, traditional European political principles and
practices:138

one of the most fundamental of which is

that established government must "seek to monopolize,
control, or at least contain" both the means and the use
of force within society.139
The willingness of the revolutionaries to abandon
their ideals is to be found in the nature of the leader. ship itself.

A sizable percentage had been reluctant

rebels, swept along by the course of events.

They had,

from the very beginning, looked askance at the "democratick" consequences of the separation from Great Britain
and shuddered before the specter of mob rule.

As soon as

practical, such men as Gerry, Dickenson, and even Wilson,

13 7w~oa.. Rising Glory, .2.£ cit, p. 1.
138Hannah Arndt, Crisis of~ Republic,· {New York:
Harcourt, Brae, Jananovich, Inc, 1972), p. 108.
1J9charles Tilly, "Collective Violence in European
Perspective," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr,
eds., Violence in America: Historical and Comparative
Perspective, (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 4-44
(41).
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moved to raise the qualifications for voting, reenfranchise former tories {who after all were of the "better
sort") and institute economic policies which proved to be
especially hard on the poorer classes who had been among
the staunchest supporters of the revolution.

Even among

the old radicals such as Samuel Adams (who wanted to hang
Shay's rebels) there was an unconscious denial of revolutionary theory, at least as being applicable to themselves.

Having established what was by definition {albeit

their own) a free government, they believed that any
attempt to alter it by force must be, also by definition,
rebellion against lawful authority.140
Although the American revolution came to an effective end during the pentad which followed the conclusion
of the War of 1812, its final act was postponed until the
1840's.

Rhode Island, like Connecticut, had retained its

social compact based colonial charter after the separation
from Great Britain.

However, unlike Connecticut (which

yielded to popular pressure and replaced its 1662
Charter141 in 1818142) the ·government of Rhode Island had
140For James Wilson's remarks about rulers denying
the right of "every revolution in government ••• excempt the
single one which conducted them to. the throne." See:
Mccloskey, .Q.E cit, p. 79.
·
141Thorpe, .Q.E cit, Vol. 1, pp. 529-536.
142Ibid, Vol. 1, pp. 536-546.
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consistent~y refused to abandon the Charter of 1663143 in
favor of a Constitution based on the authority of the
people.144

I
I

In addition to this constitutional dispute,

there was the problem of franchises

Rhode Island's voting

qualifications, though extremely liberal by seventeenth

1·

l
l

!

century standards, excluded more than fifty percent of the
potential voters after 1830.145
bin~d

These two elements com-

in 1842 to produce a political crisis which exploded

into the violence known as the Dorr Rebellion or Dorr War.
Frustrated by years of being ignored by the Charter
government and the established political parties, the reformers took matters into their own hands.
action was peaceful:

At first this

writing and adopting a People's

Constitution146 in the fall ·of 1841; and the election of
Thomas Dorr as governor in April of 1842.

However the

Charter government, claiming that the majority of those
voting could not meet the pre-existing ·sufferage requirements, refused to accept the validity of either action.
As a result, the Dorrites decided to take by force that
143rbid,
Vol. 6, pp.
3211-3222.
.
144Arthur May Mowry, The Dorr War: The Constitutional Struggle in Rhode Island:-TNew York: Chelsea
House Publishers:-1970), p •. 25.
145Marvin E. Gettleman, The Dorr Rebellions A Study
in American Radicalism, 1§2l-1849,---rN"ew York: Random
House, 1973), p. 6-7.
146Mowry,

.Q.E.

cit! pp. 322-346.
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I

which they believed was being illegally denied them.
The military phase of the Dorr Rebellion bearly
lived up to the definition of the term.147

It began with

an attempt to seize the state arsenal in Providence.

This

move was frustrated because poor security allowed the
loyalists to replace the watchmen with a strong garrison
-

among whom were several relatives of the more prominent

rebels (including both a brother and a brother-in-law of
Thomas Dorr).

This was followed by a period of relative

calm while Dorr left the state for the nation's capitol in
an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the federal government
to aid the rebels or at least remain neutral.

He returned

.to Rhode Island a month later and attempted to organize a
last ditch.attempt to gain power by

fore~.

However, this

also failed when most of his "army" disbanded upon receiving news

t~at

the Charter government had authorized a

constitutional c.onvention.148·

By the· end of June, 1842,

Dorr had fled the state and. the rebellion, fDr all .prac·tical purposes, was over.
Constitutional reform when it arrived in November of
1842149 only superficially resembled the people's constitution and did little to alter the
14 7williamson,

.Q.£·_ cit,

politica~

realities in

p. 256.

148Mowry, .QE cit, pp. 282-283.
149Thorpe, .Q..E cit,, Vol. 6, pp. 3222-3240.
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Rhode Island.150

Government remained as unenlightened as

ever and the electorate lapsed into a state of political

I.

apathy which saw the number of eligible voters casting

I

I

ballots drop from a high of 15,000 in 1843 to a low of
4,000 or approximately 20% in 1850.151
The defeat of the Dorrites signified more than the
failure of a political reform movement within a single
state.

Nationally, it sounded the death knell for revolu-

tionary theory which (like the militia system) had been ·
moribund since its defacto abandonment by those in control
·of the machinery of government a quarter of a century before.

Once the federal authorities decided to back Rhode

Island's Charter government, it became necessary to bury
revolutionary theory once and for· all.
As a result, American political theory began to
undergo a transformation· designed to firmly establish the
authority of the state governments over the people and· of
the federal government over them both.

Once sovereignty·

had been transferred from the people to the government,
the Second Amendment became little more than an embarrassing reminder of revolutionary theory to be ignored or .
explained away as being designed to protect state governments.
150williamson, .Ql?. cit, pp. 256-257.
151Ibid, p. 259.
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